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Abstract 
 
We present an analysis of over 400 comments about complying with tax obligations extracted 
from online discussion forums for freelancers. While the topics investigated by much of the 
literature on taxpayer behaviour are theory-driven, we aimed to explore the universe of online 
discussions about tax in order to extract the topics that are most relevant to taxpayers. The 
forum discussions were subjected to a qualitative thematic analysis, and we present a model of 
the ‘universe’ of tax as reflected in taxpayer discussions. The model comprises of several main 
actors (tax laws, tax authority, tax practitioners, and the taxpayer’s social network) and describes 
the multiple ways in which they relate to taxpayers’ behaviour. We also conduct a more focused 
analysis to show that the majority of taxpayers seem unconcerned with many of the variables that 
have been the focus of tax behaviour research (e.g., audits, penalties, etc.), and most people are 
motivated to be compliant and are more concerned with how to comply than whether to comply. 
Moreover, we discuss how these ‘real-world’ tax discussions question common assumptions in 
the study of tax behaviour and how they inform our understanding of business ethics more 
generally.  
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“Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is 
the theory which decides what can be observed.” (Albert Einstein) 
 
While Einstein’s observation referred to quantum mechanics, it is none less true for any field of 
knowledge where systematic empirical testing of theory is central, including economics and social 
sciences. Theoretical frameworks focus researchers on specific variables, and in turn these 
researchers collect and analyse those data that are relevant to understanding their variables of 
interest. While such systematic testing of theory is essential, it also means that certain data are 
never observed because they are not the focus of current theories. In this paper, we explore one 
particular field of study and attempt to reveal such data that have escaped systematic observation 
due to the focus of current theories in the field: the study of taxpayers’ compliance decisions.   
When the Australian billionaire and media tycoon Kerry Packer was asked about his tax affairs 
during a public inquiry, he said: “Now, of course, I am minimizing my tax, and if anybody in this 
country doesn't minimize their tax they want their heads read”. While Kerry Packer’s position 
may seem controversial to some, it will seem natural to others; in the research environment, 
‘head-reading’ efforts have attempted to establish the factors that explain this variation in how 
people make tax compliance decisions (for recent literature reviews, see Hashimzade, Myles, & 
Tran-Nam, 2013; Kirchler, 2007; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2013). 
Tax behaviour research has seen contributions from various disciplines, approaches, and 
theoretical positions. However, the field has been dominated by theoretical and laboratory-based 
research, research that is primarily driven by researchers’ assumptions (see Boll, 2013; Oats, 
2012). The mainstream approach has been to test theoretically-derived models of behaviour 
empirically, usually by eliciting people’s responses to a task (e.g., filling in a questionnaire, taking 
part in an experiment, etc.). Our approach in this paper very different: we collect and analyse 
naturally-occurring data on tax behaviour (online discussions) in a qualitative manner. We look at 
how people’s discussions confirm what we know about tax behaviour, and also if there are 
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differences between how people talk about tax ‘in the real-world’ and current results and 
assumptions in the literature.  
Some of our findings are in line with previous thinking about tax compliance behaviour; other 
findings indicate the need to revisit assumptions we make about phenomena we study. But, most 
of all, our interrogation of naturally-occurring discussions reveals some blind spots in research 
on tax compliance behaviour. We will dedicate the largest part of this paper to discussing 
findings of the analysis and their relationship with existing literature. Beforehand, we make a 
brief incursion into research on tax compliance to serve those readers less familiar with this field.  
 
Very Brief Overview of Tax Compliance Research 
The first works to look at tax compliance as an individual psychological decision were published 
by Günter Schmölders from the 1950s onwards (see, for instance, Schmölders, 1959). Although 
an economist himself, Schmölders (1959) advocated the need to use psychology to understand 
fiscal behaviour; and he was particularly interested in how people make compliance decisions 
based on their values or belonging to certain social groups (profession, ‘social class’, etc.). A 
number of later works answered his call, constructing models of tax compliance that would take 
into account the variety of psychological and social factors involved in compliance decisions 
(e.g., personal values, attitudes, social norms, peer effects, and other such factors) (see, for 
example, Lewis, 1982; Weigel, Hessing, & Elffers, 1987; for an overview, see Webley, 1991). 
More recently, psychologists studying tax behaviour have looked in depth at several 
psychological factors related to compliance, such as social norms (e.g., Wenzel, 2004), 
perceptions of tax authorities (e.g., Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008), stance towards authorities 
and government (Braithwaite, 2009), and even the ‘mental accounting’ involved in dealing with 
one’s tax affairs (Adams & Webley, 2001).  
A different stream of tax compliance research was developed in economics in the early 1970s on 
the foundation of Gary Becker's (1968) economics of crime model, a model that posits that 
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criminal decisions can be viewed as rational choices: criminals weigh up the level of penalty and 
the probability of being caught, and make a rational decision following a cost-benefit analysis. 
This approach applied to tax evasion decisions has come to be known as the ‘classic model’ of 
tax compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). Many authors subsequently noted 
the failure of the classic model to predict realistic evasion levels (see Andreoni, Erard, & 
Feinstein, 1998), and several attempts have been made to improve the model (for a review, see 
Hashimzade, Myles, & Tran-Nam, 2013), for instance by considering the role of social norms in 
deterring tax evasion (Myles & Naylor, 1996).  
As with many branches of applied economics, the perceived failure of the ‘classic model’ based 
on taxpayers as rational actors was noted by behavioural economists (see Alm, Sanchez, & de 
Juan, 1995). Many behavioural studies instead framed evasion decisions in the context of public 
goods games (i.e., tax is seen as something that all benefit from; however, individuals may be 
tempted to evade paying their share and still get a share of everyone else’s contribution). Studies 
looked at how different variations of the public goods game alter people’s decision to evade 
contributing to the public goods; such variations include, for example, participants having agency 
over penalty levels (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1999), the role of different tax rates for income 
brackets (Bosco & Mittone, 1997), and others. 
Broad Assumptions in the Tax Compliance Literature  
As pointed out elsewhere (Oats, 2012), the vast majority of works looking at tax compliance are 
situated in a positivistic research paradigm, that is, they employ systematic data collection (e.g., 
survey, experiment) and/or mathematical analyses to validate research hypotheses. While this 
approach has clear benefits in providing rigorous answers, its drawback is that hypotheses rely 
heavily on researchers’ assumptions of what is important for tax behaviour. To give one 
example, as outlined above, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) posit that audits and penalties are 
essential to understanding compliance decisions. As such, researchers’ theoretical and empirical 
analyses will become geared towards refining our understanding of the role of audits and 
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penalties. They, however, tell us nothing about the validity of our initial assumptions that audits 
and penalties are indeed important for the tax behaviour of most individuals. In a laboratory 
experiment, changing audit rates may produce an important effect on behaviour because we 
control the effect of all other factors, but in ‘the real-world’, outside the lab, audit rates may be 
one of the least important things considered by taxpayers. In the current study, we attempt to 
provide an exploration of what is important for taxpayers ‘in the real-world’, and compare the 
results of this exploration with current assumptions in the tax compliance literature. Before we 
describe our approach and method, we discuss below some specific assumptions that are common in 
tax compliance research.  
1. Regarding tax behaviour, people’s chief concern is deciding whether to comply or 
not. Most research has been geared towards understanding the tax compliance decision: to 
evade or not to evade (for reviews, see for example Andreoni et al., 1998; Kirchler, 2007; 
Pickhardt & Prinz, 2013). However, in reality, many taxpayers do not know and struggle to 
find out how to comply, rather than whether to comply, spending time on deciphering the 
complexity and abstractness of the tax code (Alm, Cherry, Jones, & McKee, 2010). Tax 
authorities estimate that a large section of people are willing to comply but don’t know how 
to do so, a much larger proportion than people who would contemplate breaking the law 
(“SME Customer Segmentation,” 2010). Certainly, it is essential to study the compliance 
decision, but other processes may be just as important in taxpaying behaviour. In reality, the 
compliance decision may be irrelevant for a large swathe of taxpayers.   
2. Compliance is a binary variable. In order to operationalise the tax compliance decision as 
simply as possible, the vast majority of studies of tax compliance assume two distinct options 
for the individual: to evade or to be fully compliant. However, as some have pointed out, 
‘real-world’ compliance is far from binary. The complexity of compliance is illustrated by the 
existence of different types of compliance (e.g., voluntary versus enforced compliance, see 
Braithwaite, 2009; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010), or by situations of taxpayers taking advantage of 
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legal ‘grey areas’ to drastically minimise tax while still complying with the letter of the law 
(tax avoidance, Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; creative compliance, McBarnet, 2004). While tax 
evasion may be defined as evading taxes with intent (McBarnet, 2004), it may be very 
difficult to determine whether misreporting on a tax return is due to evasion intent or error. 
In the attempt to simplify compliance to a binary decision for research purposes, it may be 
that such simplification bears little resemblance to the complexity of realistic tax compliance 
behaviour. 
3. The taxpayers and the tax authority are the main actors. The majority of studies have 
looked at the relationships between taxpayers and the tax authority, to the detriment of other 
‘actors’ such as peer groups, accountants and legal advisors, etc. (for a review, see Pickhardt 
& Prinz, 2013). Although it may seem that the actions of tax authorities are most important 
for tax compliance (i.e., by employing certain audit strategies, having a customer-focused 
approach, etc.), research has not focused in as much detail on the role of other ‘actors’. 
4. Taxpayers are concerned with audit rates and penalty levels. As several authors have 
noted (e.g., Andreoni et al., 1998; James & Alley, 2002; Kirchler, 2007), the field of tax 
compliance has been dominated by the economics-of-crime approach to tax evasion 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972), that is, that taxpayers make evasion decisions following a cost-
benefit analysis that takes into account the income loss if caught evading (penalty) and the 
probability of being caught (audited). In this paradigm, raising penalty levels and conducting 
more audits produces higher compliance levels; often called the deterrence approach (Alm & 
Torgler, 2011), this paradigm stresses the importance of people’s assessment of penalty and 
audit levels for compliance decisions.    
5. Alternatively, taxpayers base their decisions on social norms. Many have noted the 
failure of the deterrence model to explain why some people would not evade taxes even if 
penalties and audits never existed (e.g., Wenzel, 2004), as well as its failure to predict the high 
compliance levels observed in reality (Andreoni et al., 1998). As such, to explain why 
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compliance levels are higher than expected, many researchers propose that social norms 
account for why so many people comply when the ‘rational’ choice would be to evade. 
Evasion is thought to be mitigated by strong norms against evasion (e.g., Bobek, Roberts, & 
Sweeney, 2007; Wenzel, 2005), whether that is because people fear the negative 
consequences of reputation loss (Myles & Naylor, 1996) or because strong norms signal that 
most other taxpayers are willing to contribute to the public goods (Frey & Torgler, 2007). 
    
The Current Study 
As outlined above, certain broad assumptions seem to underpin much of research on tax 
compliance. However, there is little exploration of the extent to which these assumptions are 
relevant for tax behaviour as a whole. As we briefly discussed, there is reason to doubt that some 
of these assumptions readily reflect the reality of paying tax for many individuals. To explore 
individuals’ reality in depth, qualitative methods of inquiry may prove more effective (for an 
overview of qualitative methods in tax research, see Oats, 2012), particularly when the researcher 
is merely observing tax compliance processes without intervening (as opposed to, for instance, 
surveying taxpayers). Observation of naturally-occurring behaviour has been used extensively in 
the social sciences (for an example of ethnographic observation of tax audits, see Boll, 2013). In 
this study, we collect and analyse naturally-occurring interactions, but in an online environment 
(what is sometimes termed ‘netnography’ is business and organisational studies, see Kozinets, 
2002; see also Garcia, Standlee, Bechkoff, & Cui, 2009; Hine, 2000). We present an analysis of 
discussions about tax on online forums for self-employed individuals; this analysis is not focused 
by particular hypotheses – it is an open exploration of the tax behaviour ‘universe’ as reflected in 
people’s discussions about tax.  
We chose the virtual ethnographic approach given several advantages it presents. First, the 
approach allows us to collect data that has not been generated by a researcher and that reflects 
people’s naturally-occurring concerns. Second, it provides some insight into taxpayers’ attitudes 
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and opinions. People often discuss online with a high degree of self-disclosure, including 
sensitive topics, particularly when they address those they feel connected to (e.g., peers in the 
same profession), as opposed to disclosing to a researcher in a one-off survey or interview. 
Third, online communication is less hierarchical and may thus allow more freedom of expression 
than traditional research settings that place the researcher in an expert position (for overviews, 
see Hine, 2013; Kozinets, 2015).  
Method 
Data Collection 
The dataset analysed consists of over 400 user comments about tax on discussions forums for 
self-employed professionals in the UK. The dataset comprises of 144 conversations on these 
forums: a forum user asks a question or raises an issue related to tax which is followed by other 
users replying, debating, advising, sharing their own experience, etc. These online forums are not 
specialised tax forums, but general forums for individuals who work as freelancers and/or run 
micro-businesses, where individuals will discuss a wide range of issues (e.g., how to start and run 
a business, how to advertise products, etc.), including legal issues and taxation.  
This particular data collection strategy was preferred for several reasons. First, we focused on 
general forums rather than those specialised on tax issues because we aimed to collect 
conversations relevant to people who have no expertise or keen interest in taxation. Second, we 
chose to focus on self-employed individuals, as they represent a relatively simple case for 
understanding tax compliance. This contrasts with taxation in small or even medium-sized 
businesses where decisions are more complex, often being distributed among directors, involving 
a larger number of taxes, etc. Mitigating factors such as reputation loss and the influence of 
norms take on a different hue when considering more formal organizations (for studies of 
organizational compliance see, for example Edelman & Talesh, 2011; Parker, 2000). Third, we 
chose online discussion forums as opposed to other social media because discussions on these 
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forums tend to be more elaborate than those usually posted on social networking sites, allowing 
more depth to the analysis.  
We chose to focus on the UK rather than include more countries because narrowing the focus 
allowed a more comprehensive data collection strategy. Although we do not make any claims 
regarding how representative the comments collected are for all discussions about tax among 
UK self-employed professionals, we have endeavoured to select the most prominent forums for 
a range of certain occupations, and included all comments about tax on those forums. Most of 
the comments included in the analysis were collected on a general discussion forum for 
freelancers, but we also aimed to include specialised forums for particular professions (those 
included here are forums for artists, designers, construction industry professionals, nurses, 
doctors, beauticians and hairdressers, and IT contractors). The selection of these groups, 
however, is not intended to imply that behaviour in these groups is different from the wider 
population. 
To make sure we include all potentially relevant discussions, we selected from the relevant 
forums all the discussions that contained the term ‘tax’, and subsequently eliminated from the 
dataset only those where ‘tax’ was used to refer to something other than taxation (e.g., people 
using ‘taxing’ to mean ‘demanding’).  Data was collected in late 2013 – early 2014, but some of 
the comments were posted as early as 2003, although most were much more recent. All the 
information collected is publicly-available, and did not require the researcher to register as a 
forum user in order to access it.  
Thematic Analysis 
To analyse the conversations we employed thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Considered 
the most widely used qualitative analysis method, thematic analysis provides a systematic 
approach to extract meaning from text data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). We used qualitative analysis 
software (NVivo), and began by open-coding all the comments in the dataset (i.e., a process of 
assigning a label to each comment relevant to its content, for instance ‘tax authority’ or ‘fine’). 
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This process allowed the creation of a set of categories that were further refined, that is, similar 
themes were merged, or large and heterogeneous themes were split into sub-themes. This 
iterative process of refining categories while ensuring they are true to the underlying data 
ultimately produced a number of themes that presents our interpretation of all the data collected.  
As Braun and Clarke (2006) argue, because thematic analysis is a flexible method of analysis 
when compared to most other qualitative methods that have strict methodological and 
philosophical underpinnings, it is important for researchers to acknowledge their particular 
philosophy in analysing the data; our stance in this particular study is a realist one that assumes 
people’s talk is reflective of thoughts, attitudes, or motivations (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; for a 
discussion of the different epistemologies in thematic analysis, see Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
 
Results and Discussion 
We begin by discussing the themes that emerged from our data analysis, and follow this 
presentation with a discussion of the broad assumptions in the tax compliance literature we 
identified in the introduction – whether and how these assumptions are reflected in naturally-
occurring discussions among taxpayers.  
Model and Findings 
The results provide an overview of the content of discussions analysed. Figure 1 presents the 
data categories and their relationships. Following presentation of the model, we discuss each 
theme in detail, providing quotations from the dataset to illustrate each of the themes 
(quotations have been paraphrased in order to maintain confidentiality). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The model presented in Figure 1 serves to illustrate and organise the main themes in the dataset. 
To organise the themes, we identified the main ‘actors’ in these tax discussions, and then the 
sub-themes that reflect the relationship between the taxpayers and these ‘actors’. In the process 
of dealing with his or her tax affairs, the taxpayer deals with: (1) the laws and regulations relating 
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to tax compliance, (2) the tax authority, (3) tax practitioners, and (4) the wider social network of 
the taxpayer (for example, co-workers, members of the same professional group, family and 
friends, etc.). We focus below on how all these ‘actors’ are reflected in the comments we 
analysed and on describing the relationship between the taxpayer and each of the ‘actors’. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Laws and regulations   
The majority of comments (please see Table 1) included in the analysis referred to tax laws, rules, 
regulations, such as requirements to register with the tax authority when trading, deadlines for 
payment, types of taxes due, etc., as well as recent legal changes. One of the main concerns of 
taxpayers interacting on the online forums was to make sense of laws and regulations, receive 
uncomplicated explanations from other forum users and understand which rules apply to their 
particular situation. Others who are generally familiar with basic taxpaying rules may use online 
discussions to determine whether all general rules apply to their circumstances, or if they can 
make use of exemptions or even set up business structures that are tax-effective. Therefore, our 
dataset showed two main distinct ways for taxpayers to approach laws and regulations: (1) 
making sense of existing rules; or (2) negotiating the legal landscape by understanding if rules 
apply to their circumstance and how to follow rules that are in their favour. We briefly discuss 
these two types of approaching rules below. 
Sense-making. Many of the online discussions analysed began with a user requesting advice in 
making sense of tax rules, as illustrated by the comments below.  
1. I have ABSOLUTELY no clue when it comes to this sort of thing, I take it I have to register with 
[the tax authority] who will advise what I owe them. Can you guys give ANY advice on the matter 
or refer me to any books or articles. 
2. I have set an inclusive price for the products and postage. While exports from UK to the EU are 
tax-free, I don’t know enough about exports from UK to US or Canada. I began reading some tax 
documents but my brain went into meltdown. Is there any import duty? I’d appreciate your 
advice? 
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Many comments stress that they find tax complicated, and the general information provided by 
the tax authority or by accountants, confusing.  
1. The [tax authority] website is so complicated, I could not find any information relating to small 
items of equipment. [query regarding allowable expenses] 
2. Taxes are one of the things that give us headaches.  
As such, a large number of comments are dedicated to laying out the rules in simple terms, 
sometimes discussing and debating the accuracy of information presented.      
1. yes you have to pay tax - you have to register as if you are selling work. 
2. V.A.T is not needed... in fact, it’s likely you won’t need to be V.A.T. registered for the future 
either. 
3. How much you have to pay the taxman is immaterial, the non-declaration is a crime, whether 
for millions or a tenner. [responding to a debate regarding a minimal income for registration] 
 
The sense-making process does not only involve finding out what the rules are, but 
understanding the logic behind the rules. Such sense-making in which people learn that rules are 
consistent with what they perceive to be acceptable standards of behaviour is likely to increase 
compliance (Paine, 1994). 
You have to register as sole trader (self-employed) so that you can claim expenses. Which you 
want to do - otherwise you're giving away free tax money! […] When you report income on your 
tax return, if you're not registered as self-employed you'd have to put it under a different section 
and end up paying too much tax. 
 
Negotiation. As outlined above, a large number of comments refer to the general rules of 
paying tax, typically income tax. A different category of comments about laws and rules discusses 
potential exemptions and ways of using existing rules to pay less tax.  
The simplest of cases refers to discussing exemptions (e.g., not having to pay income tax for low 
earnings, etc.).  
As for VAT, you wouldn't have to have a VAT as long as your taxable earnings are under £68,000 
per year. […] When you are asked to provide a VAT number you simply say that you are not VAT 
registered. 
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Other discussions refer to the most advantageous ways to save tax, for instance by making sure 
all potential work-related expenses are claimed, as illustrated below:  
You have to register as sole trader in order to claim expenses. Which is best to do if you're 
reporting income - otherwise you're handing them free tax money! 
 
Or, as shown in the example below, finding the most tax-efficient business structure:  
What is the optimal way to sort out my TAX? 1. Invoice to job agency for my contract jobs from 
my Company […] 2. Register as employee with job agent […] 3. Any other way? 
 
The instances where people attempt to find ways to more be tax-efficient are placed on a 
continuum from the most common-place practices (e.g., making sure one claims all allowable 
expenses), to more complicated ways to minimise tax liability, some of which may even be 
considered tax avoidance, such as a number of comments about how to avoid paying taxes: 
1. I just wondered whether artists need to pay tax on work they sell, if so are there good ways to 
avoid it (apart from not declaring income), as I know you agree we seem pay tax on pretty much 
everything. Thanks. 
2. Do I still have to pay the tax on work that I've picked up from overseas? Thinking if there is any 
clause whereby I can avoid paying as much tax (hope!). 
 
Tax authority 
A significant number of comments mention the tax authority. We categorised three ways that 
taxpayers talk about the tax authority: (1) as a source of expertise about laws and regulations; (2) 
as an arbiter that people can contact to validate their interpretation of existing rules; and (3) as a 
subjective law enforcer in relation to which they manage their image as compliant taxpayers.    
Use expertise. The tax authority is talked about as a source of knowledge about tax laws and 
regulations; for the most part, people report positive experiences receiving expertise and 
guidance from the tax authority, and encourage others to seek assistance.   
1. […], went to the local tax office and asked them for help. They were fantastically helpful. […] 
They helped me go through any and all tax liabilities, […]. I mean, it was obvious I wasn't a tax 
evader or avoider - I just didn’t have a clue. 
2. I'd highly recommend going through the [tax authority] site, or calling if you need help (the 
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sole trader people are very helpful and friendly) 
 
Arbitrate. When regulations are unclear or taxpayers feel these can be interpreted in a number 
of ways, they also relate to the tax authority as an arbiter that can rule whether it regards a certain 
practice as compliant or noncompliant, such as in the example below. 
1. No, seriously, logically thinking it should be fine but the cynicism of the taxman should not be 
underestimated. I think you should write to them, make your best case, then if they don't take it 
as a joke & reply in writing to give you the go ahead you're covered. 
2. Oh, in that case, I would get it confirmed in writing [from the tax authority] if I were you. 
 
Manage image. Finally, a number of comments refer to managing one’s image in relation to the 
tax authority, acknowledging that decisions that a taxpayers is or not compliant are in many cases 
subjective. There is the concern with what one’s actions may ‘look like’ to the tax authority. 
1. Also, consider the sum of the claim versus your total self-employment income or expenses. If 
it's small, it's likely to be more acceptable. [For instance, all my trips are] only 6% of my total 
annual expenses. So it doesn't seem like I'm trying to pull a fast one. 
2. Then, when they get back to you I would be honest with them, […]. Be as proactive as possible 
and you might convince them you've goofed and you were not deliberately avoiding them. 
 
 
Tax practitioners 
It should be noted that although a significant number of comments mention accountants and tax 
practitioners, many of these question the need for self-employed individuals to employ the 
service of an accountant.  
1. My first year as a freelancer just ended and I made no profit. […] Do I need an accountant or 
will I be able to fill in the online form without one? 
2. No, you don't need an accountant. You've got it right – sum up the total sales, subtract the 
expenses and then the result is the profit for taxing.  
 
This second comment reflects the fragility of advice in this arena; it is not actually correct. Of 
those that stress the need for an accountant, however, the primary relationship with the taxpayer 
is to provide guidance, both in understanding the law and in finding tax savings. 
1. BUT it is not legal accounting advice. If in doubt, get some proper advice. Even a small local 
accountant might give you a consultation cheaply. 
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2. Your accountant will advise you if you have to register for VAT, so you don’t need to worry 
about that. This is assuming that your accountant does his job properly. 
 
Social network 
Finally, a significant number of comments refer to communication and interaction within the 
taxpayer’s social network that is relevant to tax compliance. Taxpayers share information specific 
to their network, share own experiences and advice about how to best deal with taxes, and may 
also try to influence other taxpayers to be compliant, and generally offer support to those who 
feel anxious.  
Legal information. 
As outlined above, most comments refer to tax rules. However, there is an important aspect of 
how rules are communicated in specific social groups, such as the occupational group. Many 
taxpayers want to receive information from those in the same occupation and to follow the 
practice of the occupation – this denotes a role for the norms in the professional group for tax 
compliance.  
1. I guess I should go and talk to the tax office nearer the time but I wanted to speak to other 
artists first and see what they do. 
2. The other nurses I work with have said that transport and meals are allowable expenses and 
that they've claimed for years successfully and have not been audited.   
 
Best practice advice. Through interacting with others, taxpayers do not just learn about tax 
laws, but receive advice from those more experienced, for example how to keep track of their 
expenses, how to find a suitable accountant, and so on.  
1. Get an accountant – Switch to part time, or get a night job while you start things up – Don’t 
assume a good April will mean a good May, things are quite seasonal - Mates rates don’t exist – 
[etc] 
2. I only keep a simple cash book, and use one page for "Money in" and another page for "Money 
out".  
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Persuasion. Social networks do not only serve to transmit information – some people actively 
try to influence others’ actions, especially when compliance decisions are involved.  
1. If you are not paying tax, as you previously said, then it is only a matter of time before they get 
to you and recover what is owed.  
2. He needs to deal with it [sort out his tax affairs]. Once the weight is lifted off his shoulders he 
will feel much better. 
Support. Finally, social networks serve as support through the often stressful taxpaying process, 
as illustrated by the comment below. 
However, I really wouldn't worry that much about it. I am sure that it happens a lot. I don't know 
the answer but there are lots of people on here who know about this type of thing so one of them 
should be able to help.  
 
 
Assumptions in the Tax Compliance Literature 
We set out with the intention to see whether and how our findings match the broad assumptions 
researchers often make in the tax compliance literature. As outlined in the introductory section, 
we are not the first to question these assumptions, but we attempt to provide empirical support 
based on analysing naturally-occurring data. We discuss below our findings in relation to each 
assumption in turn.  
1. Regarding tax behaviour, people’s chief concern is not to decide whether to comply or 
not.  
Although the overwhelming majority of studies looking at tax behaviour have focused on tax 
compliance and the compliance decision, the main concern of taxpayers in our dataset is to find 
out how to comply, to understand and navigate the complex legal landscape. Their chief concern 
is to make sure they are compliant, rather than to understand how to evade taxes. A relatively 
small number of cases do discuss practices that may be considered tax avoidance (see also 
‘creative compliance’, McBarnet, 2004), the concern being to make sure one is compliant with 
legislation but significantly minimises his or her liability.  
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Regarding all taxpayers as potential evaders has been described as a bias in the tax behaviour 
literature (Kirchler, 2007). The focus on tax compliance decisions is also reflected by the few 
studies that look at tax communication, which propose that taxpayers who talk about tax 
exchange information about ways to evade tax and avoid detection (Stalans, Kinsey, & Smith, 
1991), about the frequency of audits and other people’s evasion behaviour (Hashimzade, Myles, 
Page, & Rablen, 2013), and who has been audited in one’s social network (Rincke & Traxler, 
2009), all of which are topics that feed directly into compliance decisions. While we accept that 
taxpayers may communicate about these topics, our dataset suggests that their overwhelming 
concern is to make sense of the rules of tax compliance in order to make sure they are 
compliant, rather than request information that will help them evade without detection or 
penalty. Our dataset suggests that the acquisition of tax knowledge is more central than the 
compliance decision to the tax behaviour of the majority of taxpayers – a majority who are 
motivated to be compliant and not concerned with ways to evade taxes. Our findings suggest 
that the majority of taxpayers are compliant; this conclusion echoes wider debates regarding 
business ethics. An increasing number of authors suggest that the ethical behaviour of business 
leaders cannot be fully understood through the lens of a rational actor maximizing her or his 
own utility – this leads to an underestimation of ethical behaviour. Instead, many business 
leaders are driven by ethical principles and values (e.g., Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Gentile, 
2010; Messick & Bazerman, 1996), although they may possess or report an inflated sense of their 
own ethics (Randall & Fernandes, 1991). 
2. Compliance is not a binary variable.  
In relation to the compliance decision, the tax compliance literature has widely regarded tax 
compliance as a binary variable with two potential outcomes: compliant and noncompliant 
(Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; McBarnet, 2004). Considering compliance as a binary decision has 
important advantages for its measurement; however, compliance behaviour is in reality much 
more complex than a decision between evasion and full compliance (Braithwaite, 2009). As 
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discussed above, compliance in our dataset takes a number of forms, including finding ways to 
drastically minimise tax liability while complying with the law. In this respect, our dataset echoes 
other authors in that compliance and noncompliance can take many qualitatively-different forms 
and that studying taxpaying decisions as a binary choice between compliance and evasion does 
not reflect the complex reality of behaviour (e.g., Braithwaite, 2009; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010).  
Not only does compliance take many forms, tax evasion is also much less clear in reality than the 
way it is measured in tax experiments. Since evasion relates to a person’s conscious intention to 
evade taxes, this personal intention is difficult to assess and distinguish from simple calculation 
error. As such, assigning to a taxpayer who has filled in a tax return the intention to evade may 
constitute a subjective decision of tax inspectors (Boll, 2013). This concern with the subjectivity 
of tax evasion judgements is apparent in the online discussions, where people comment on how 
to make sure honest mistakes are not interpreted as intentional evasion by tax inspectors.  
It becomes apparent that research looking at compliance as a binary outcome (full compliance 
versus evasion) may lack relevance for the way that compliance plays out in reality, in its many 
forms shaped by the interaction of taxpayers, tax practitioners, and the tax authority. We hope 
that future research addresses this gap by looking at the many forms of compliance, including tax 
avoidance, and also looking at distinguishing between honest error and evasion intention.    
3. The taxpayer and the tax authority are not the only main actors.  
As Pickhardt and Prinz (2013) argue in their review of tax compliance literature, the main 
interaction studied in the literature concerns the private relationship between the taxpayer and 
the tax authority; however, other actors may be as important or even more important for 
understanding tax behaviour, such as tax practitioners or the taxpayer’s social network. Indeed, 
more comments in our dataset referred to communication with people in one’s professional 
group or friends and family, and the involvement of tax practitioners, than comments that 
referred to the tax authority. Although there has been some interest in the role of tax 
practitioners (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Hite & Hasseldine, 2003; Roberts, 1998; Stephenson, 2010) 
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and taxpayer social networks (e.g., Beers, Nestor, & San Juan, 2013; Hashimzade, Myles, Page, et 
al., 2013; Ashby & Webley, 2008), more research is needed to understand the role of 
practitioners and of other taxpayers in taxpayer behaviour.  
4. Taxpayers are seldom concerned with audit rates and penalty levels.    
Given the classic model of tax compliance decisions based on appraisals of audit probability and 
penalty levels (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972), we would expect high concern in the online 
discussions with these variables. While audits and penalties may be of interest to taxpayers, they 
are usually unknown; tax authorities do not usually disclose the number of audits carried out, and 
while penalty levels are public, they are unknown to many taxpayers (Barham & Fox, 2011). As 
such, in order to estimate the likelihood of audits, people may seek information about recent 
audits in their social network (Hashimzade, Myles, Page, et al., 2013). If penalty levels and audit 
likelihoods were essential to tax behaviour, we would expect people to also seek information 
online from peers about audits and penalties. However, comments that mention audits are 
relatively few; of these, for the most part, audits are mentioned as a general deterrent, with no 
reference to likelihood (see Table 1).  
The biggest risk if you don't declare fully is that the taxman will assume you have been earning a 
certain amount (usually based on similar businesses) and hit you with the bill, plus  penalties and 
fines. 
 
No comments mention people discussing having been audited or others’ experience of audits. 
Only a very small number are concerned with the cost-benefit analysis of evasion:  
It depends on the risk you want to take! In my opinion, it’s not worth the risk if your earnings are 
small. 
 
It is interesting to observe the term ‘risk’ used in this context. While there is much debate about 
tax risk management in the context of large business taxpayers (see for example Lavermicocca, 
2011; Mulligan & Oats, 2009), there is no research dealing with this aspect of individual 
compliance. Importantly, although some people mention penalties in general as deterrent, only 
one instance discusses the actual penalty level, and this is a late-filing penalty.  
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5. Alternatively, some taxpayers base their decisions on social norms.   
An alternative to the view that people comply due to existing deterrents is that people comply 
due to existing norms against evasion, being motivated to conform to what other people like 
themselves do (Onu & Oats, 2015; Wenzel, 2004). People may be influenced by a multitude of 
norms, such as national norms, family norms, workplace norms, etc. Since we sourced data from 
discussion forums for particular professions, the most relevant norms are those in the 
professional groups (e.g., norms in the hairdressing industry, norms in the IT industry, etc.). A 
number of comments in the dataset refer to the professional group as relevant for tax behaviour, 
in particular as a source of specialised knowledge about practice in the profession (Ashby, 
Webley, & Haslam, 2009). There is very little indication in our dataset that people discuss norms 
in terms of approval/disapproval of evasion (i.e., injunctive norms, Cialdini & Trost, 1998), but 
only of norms understood as current practice in the profession (i.e., descriptive norms). 
Any UK artists who know the answer? How do you enter small items of equipment in your 
accounts?  
 
Although we cannot tell from analysing the comments whether discussions about current norms 
in the profession influence behaviour, these types of norms are most likely to influence people 
when tax rules are ambiguous (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). The influence of social norms in the 
profession on compliance relates more widely to organisational ethical behaviour, where 
compliance with organisational rules of conduct and the law is chiefly influenced by the existence 
and promotion of an ethical culture in organizations (‘National Business Ethics Survey’, 2013; 
see also Parker, 2000).     
 
Conclusion 
Our study introduces the analysis of naturally-occurring online discussions to the study of tax 
behaviour. We set out to explore discussions about tax among freelancers and small business 
owners. We found that the ‘universe’ of tax behaviour as reflected in these online discussions is 
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dominated by the need to acquire knowledge about tax laws and regulations, knowledge that will 
help taxpayers be compliant, but that may also allow them to organise their tax affairs in the 
most efficient way. Several actors play an important role – the tax authority, tax practitioners, 
and the wider social network of the taxpayer.  
Our analysis highlights several way in which taxpayers relate to their tax obligations. First, 
taxpayers seek to make sense of existing regulations. In this sense-making process, the tax 
authority, tax practitioners and the wider social networks all play an important role. Second, and 
perhaps more interesting, taxpayers seek to negotiate compliance boundaries. Many taxpayers 
seek to understand the various ways of being compliant and choose that which is most efficient 
for their business. In this process, they rely on their social network to seek out all the alternatives 
available to them and they rely on the tax authority to arbitrate whether their arrangements are in 
line with regulations. They also seek out existing norms and practices in their relevant groups 
(e.g., profession) when deciding how to handle their tax affairs. Taxpayers do not only negotiate 
being compliant by the way they organize their tax affairs, but also by managing their image as 
honest taxpayers in relation to the tax authority. A small number of the taxpayers in our dataset 
display noncompliant stances and seek approval in their social network. Further to helping 
taxpayers understand and negotiate tax regulations, the wider social network also performs other 
functions: providing general best practice advice in relation to dealing with tax obligations, 
persuading defiant taxpayers to become compliant, and general social support.  
Some of the processes highlighted above have been addressed by past research, such as the 
acquisition of tax knowledge (e.g., Alm et al., 2010), or the role of social norms in tax behaviour 
(e.g., Bobek et al., 2007; Wenzel, 2004). However, other processes have received less attention. 
For instance, the fact that taxpayers discuss ways to appear honest so that they are not 
considered noncompliant highlights the way that compliance is negotiated in the relationship 
between the tax payers and the tax inspector (see also Boll, 2013). In addition, compliance is 
influenced by the social network, as taxpayers seek to influence and persuade other taxpayers to 
 
 
RUNNING HEAD: TAX TALK 
25 
 
comply with regulations (see also Onu & Oats, in press). The analysis also stresses the various 
ways in which taxpayers negotiate compliance based on information received from practitioners, 
tax authority, and the wider social network. Compliance is not clear-cut and a priori defined, it is 
negotiated in an environment of existing norms and practices (see also Gracia & Oats, 2012). 
This conclusion is not only relevant to tax compliance, but highlights more broadly that ethical 
business behaviour is not only guided by abstract regulations, but it is also socially-situated and 
negotiated between various actors (e.g., regulators, advisors, wider professional and social 
network) (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994).     
In addition to analysing the ‘universe’ of taxpayers’ concerns as they appear in spontaneous 
discussions, we set out to compare these findings to the focus of the tax behaviour literature. 
Our primary finding is that most taxpayers seem to be unconcerned with the compliance 
decision; they are highly motivated to comply and their main concern is to seek information 
about how to be compliant. However, the focus of the literature on tax behaviour has 
overwhelmingly been on tax compliance decisions (for a review, see Kirchler, 2007). We do not 
aim to question the validity of research into tax compliance decisions, but rather to question 
whether taking a compliance decision is relevant to most taxpayers. When compliance is actually 
discussed, it appears far from a straight-forward binary decision between full compliance and 
evasion. People may be motivated to be compliant but may misunderstand their obligations or 
make errors; although they may have not had the intention to evade, they discuss the subjective 
nature of judgements made by tax inspectors regarding their intentions. People also discuss ways 
to minimise their tax liability, including practices that could be considered tax avoidance. Our 
analysis of comments not only suggests that most taxpayers are concerned with being compliant, 
but that there are many qualitatively different forms of compliance. For the most part, the tax 
compliance literature has focused on the dichotomy between compliance and evasion. Our 
analysis, however, suggests that this might be overly reductionist if we are to explain compliance 
in ‘the real world’, and supports calls for understanding the multiple types of compliance (see 
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also Boll, 2013; Braithwaite, 2009; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). An understanding of tax behaviour 
beyond the dichotomy of compliance/noncompliance should be of particular interest to policy 
makers who seek to understand practices such as ‘aggressive tax planning’ or ‘tax avoidance’ as 
they are negotiated in practice (see Gracia & Oats, 2012).  
We also looked at whether people are concerned with finding out about audits and penalties, or 
social norms regarding evasion, as suggested by the compliance literature (see Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972; and Wenzel, 2004, respectively). We found little evidence of people being 
concerned with finding out about audit probabilities or penalty levels. There was also little 
evidence of people discussing their approval or disapproval (i.e., injunctive norm) of tax evasion. 
However, some people did discuss what others do (descriptive norm, Bobek et al., 2007) in 
relation to their tax affairs and taxpayers are even actively encouraged to comply (see also Onu & 
Oats, in press). These findings are indicative of the fact that the wider social environment can 
have a positive effect on business ethical decisions (Christie, Kwon, Stoeberl, & Baumhart, 
2003). It is important to note that our research also does not aim to question the validity of 
previous research on the effect of deterrence factors on tax behaviour on those people who do 
indeed consider evading, but to question whether many people consider evasion at all. Our aim 
is thus to question the focus of research on tax behaviour on evasion decisions and propose that 
other topics may be essential to understanding the experience of the majority of compliant 
taxpayers. Such avenues include further research into people’s acquisition and understanding of 
complex tax regulations, and the role of taxpayers’ social networks and their tax practitioners in 
this process. Also, a deeper understanding of the different manifestations of compliance is 
desirable to focusing on the dichotomy of compliance-evasion. 
The focus of research on tax behaviour has important practical implications for informing tax 
authority activities. A research field focused on the evasion decision will advise tax 
administrations to focus on audits, publicising large penalties, or ‘naming and shaming’ evaders, 
and support an ‘enforcement’ paradigm in dealing with taxpayers (Alm et al., 2010). However, 
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the academic focus on deterring evasion will bring little contribution to all those areas of tax 
administration that affect the large majority of compliant taxpayers, areas such as educating 
people about their tax obligations, making sure they are confident enough to approach 
authorities, that they find it easy to comply. Despite the fact that ‘the service approach’ is 
increasingly at the core of tax administrations around the world, few academic researchers 
conduct research to inform how to support compliant taxpayers (for an exception, see for 
example Alm et al., 2010). Although our analysis has dealt the compliance of individuals, similar 
analyses of online discussions may be helpful to understand attitudes and opinions related the tax 
compliance of large taxpayers (see for example Christians, 2012; Datt, 2014). 
It is important to note that our study relies on people’s public discussions, and it is likely that 
people may discuss compliance decisions to a larger extent in private settings. This limitation is 
common to all other studies of tax compliance that rely on self-report, such as those employing 
interviews, large-scale surveys, or experiments where compliance behaviour is observed; given 
that tax evasion is often perceived as immoral and illegal, people are reluctant to admit to 
noncompliance to peers or to a researcher. Despite this limitation, self-reports are central to tax 
compliance research and many seminal works in the field rely on self-report measures. And 
although there is debate of the extent to which self-reports reflect people’s actual compliance 
behavior, self-reports are considered to be very useful albeit imperfect proxies for actual 
compliance behaviour (for a discussion, see Elffers, Robben, & Hessing, 1992). Although our 
study employs self-report, we use naturally-occurring discussion among peers, which often 
provide more accurate reflections of actual behavior than self-reports given in interviews or 
surveys because they avoid the researcher biasing responses (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001; 
Wooffitt, 2005).  
It is also important to note that we do not aim to provide conclusions that are representative of 
all taxpayers. Our dataset is limited to self-employed professionals and owners of very small 
businesses, who carry out their business in the UK and who are accustomed to interacting in an 
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online environment. Nonetheless, it is likely that the content of communications about tax 
between these professionals is similar to those like them operating in other countries, or 
discussing tax in other types of public fora. People who run more established businesses, or 
those with particular knowledge of tax may display different behaviour. The forums selected in 
our dataset are the large and reputable online communities. It may be that in more private 
settings (such as face-to-face communication or online communication in smaller private 
groups), people may be more likely to discuss noncompliance decisions rather than seek 
information about how to comply, but having no access to such private discussions it is difficult 
to assess to what extent this is true. Overall, despite the limitations inherent in analysing public 
self-report data, we believe that the current study is valuable in offering an in-depth exploration 
of naturally-occurring discussions. 
We hope other researchers will seek to analyse naturally-occurring data to investigate tax 
behaviour and business ethical decisions more generally. The online environment provides vast 
opportunities for collecting such data though the use of social media sites, forums, news website 
and user comments sections, blogs, etc. (for overviews, see Hine, 2013; Kozinets, 2015). Equally, 
more traditional sources can be included, such as transcripts of boardroom discussions, media 
programme transcripts, letters to editors of news outlets, and others. The great advantage of 
such data is that they are produced with no interference from the researcher, not having been 
elicited by survey questions or an experimental design, and provide the opportunity to explore 
the topics that are most important and relevant to the people we study.  
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Table 1. Occurrence of instances of themes in the dataset 
 
MAIN THEMES  
AND SUBTHEMES 
OCCURENCES IN 
DATASET 
Laws and regulations  
Sense-making 345 
Negotiation 233 
Tax authority  
Use expertise 37 
Arbitrate 31 
Manage image 7 
Tax practitioners  
Provide guidance 63 
Social network  
Legal information 82 
Best practice advice 77 
Persuasion 17 
Support 15 
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST  
Audits 14 
Penalties 16 
Norms of professional group 35 
Note: Each data point represents a contribution by a forum member. As such, each contribution may 
refer to several themes and be coded simultaneously as part of multiple categories. 
 
 
